Abstract: This paper shows how to efficiently transform any 3-round public-coin honest verifier zero knowledge argument system for any language in NP into a 4 round (round-optimal) concurrent zero knowledge argument for 
Introduction
Zero knowledge (ZK for short) proof, a proof that reveals nothing but the validity of the assertion, was put forward in the seminal paper of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [1] . Since its introduction, especially after the useful results demonstrated in Ref. [2] , ZK proofs have become a fundamental tool in the design of cryptographic protocols. In recent years, the research is moving towards extending the security to cope with today's malicious communication environment. In particular, Dwork, et al. [3] introduced the stronger notion of concurrent zero knowledge and studied the effect of executing several instances of the same protocol concurrently. Though the concurrent zero knowledge protocols have wide applications in networks like Internet, unfortunately, they require logarithmic rounds for languages outside BPP in the plain model for the black-box case [4] and therefore are of round inefficiency. In the common reference string model, Damgard [5] showed that 3-round concurrent zero knowledge can be achieved efficiently. Surprisingly, using non-black-box technique, Barak [6] constructed a constant round non-black-box bounded concurrent zero knowledge protocol, which however is very inefficient.
We study the concurrent zero knowledge in a weak model with a very relaxed set-up assumption, the bare public-key model, which was introduced in Ref. [7] with the aim of getting constant round resettable zero knowledge arguments. Compared with some previous model such as common reference string model and the preprocessing model [8] , this model seems to have minimal set-up assumption: It just assumes that each verifier stores a public key in a public file before any interaction with the prover begins. Note that we don't need any trust party to check something in the set-up stage. Despite its simplicity, the notion of soundness in this model, as Micali and Reyzin [9] pointed out, is subtler. There are four distinct notions of soundness: one time, sequential, concurrent and resettable soundness, each of which implies the previous one, moreover, there is NO black-box rZK satisfying resettable soundness for some non-trivial language.
Though there are arguments satisfying stronger notion of security than concurrent zero knowledge in the bare public-key model, such as resettable zero knowledge arguments with concurrent soundness [10] , the study of concurrent zero knowledge in this model is still meaningful: almost known resettable zero knowledge arguments with concurrent soundness rely heavily on subexponential hardness assumption, while concurrent zero knowledge argument with concurrent soundness assumes only polynomial hardness assumption, as shown by Di Crescenzo and Visconti in Ref. [11] (a previous one with little flaw appeared in Ref. [12] ).
Our results. We show an efficient transformation from any 3-round public-coin honest verifier zero knowledge argument system for any language in NP into a 4 round (round-optimal) concurrent perfect zero knowledge argument for the same language in the bare public-key model. [1] , in which their transformation requires an overhead of Θ(n) (more than 7n, where n is the security parameter) exponentiations, our protocol is significantly more efficient and enjoys stronger notion of security, i.e., perfect zero knowledge (note that the protocol in Ref. [11] enjoys only computational zero knowledge). To implement this efficient transformation, we also develop a 3-round public-coin proof of knowledge of committed discrete log that requires only several (constant) exponentiations, which may be of independent interest.
An independent work [13] . Very recently (after submission of this work), independent of this work, Visconti improved the results in Ref. [11] and also obtained an efficient concurrent computational zero knowledge argument
for NP in BPK model [13] using a little more complicated technique. However, in this paper, beyond contribution to an efficient construction, we also achieve higher security, i.e., perfect zero knowledge, under assumption weaker than that assumed in Ref. [13] (our concurrent perfect zero knowledge argument relies on DL assumption, which is weaker than DDH assumption used to achieve concurrent computational zero knowledge argument in Ref. [13] ).
Preliminaries
In this section, we present some definitions and tools that will be used later.
We say a function μ(⋅) is negligible if for every positive polynomial f(⋅) and all sufficiently large n, it holds that μ(n)<1/f(n). We denote by λ← R Λ the process of picking a random element λ from Λ.
The BPK model. The bare public-key model (BPK model) makes the following assumptions: 1) a public file F that is a collection of records, and each containing a verifier's public key is available to the prover; 2) an honest prover P is an interactive deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that gives as inputs a security parameter n, a n-bit string x∈L, where L is an NP language, an auxiliary input w (the witness for x∈L, a public file F and a random tape r; 3) an honest verifier V is an interactive deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that works in two stages. In stage one, on inputting a security parameter n and a random tape, V generates a key pair (pk,sk) and stores pk in the file F. In stage two, on inputting sk, an n-bit string x and a random string y, V performs the interactive protocol with a prover, and outputs "accept x" or "reject x". Definition 1. We say that the protocol (P,V) is complete for a language L in NP if for all n-bit string x∈L and any witness w such that (x,w)∈R L , here R L is the relation induced by L, the probability that V interacts with P on the input w and outputs "reject x" is negligible in n.
Malicious prover and its attacks in the BPK model. Let s be a positive polynomial and P * be a s-concurrent malicious prover. On inputting a public key of V, P * performs at most s sessions as follows: 1) if P * is already running i−1 sessions, 1<i−1<s, it can output a special message "Starting x i " to start a new protocol with V on the new statement; 2) at any point, it can output a message for any of its sessions, then immediately receives the verifier's response and continues.
A concurrent attack of a s-concurrent malicious prover P * is executed in this way: 1) V runs on input n and a random string, and then obtains the key pair (pk,sk); 2) P * runs on input n and pk. Whenever P * starts a new session on a new statement chosen by itself, V is run on the new statement, a new random string and sk.
Definition 2. we say (P,V) satisfies concurrent soundness for a language L if for all positive polynomial s, for all s-concurrent malicious prover P * , the probability that is in an execution of concurrent attack, V outputing "accept
x" for a false statement x∉L is negligible in n.
Definition 3.
An interactive argument system (P,V) in the BPK model is concurrent zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M such that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm V * , for any polynomial s, for any x i ∈L, the length of x i is n, i=1,…,s, the following two distributions are indistinguishable:
1. the output of V * that firstly generates F with s entries and interacts concurrently with s 2 instances of the honest prover: P(x i ,w i ,pk i ,F), 1≤i,j≤s, and each instance of the honest prover uses independent random strings, where w i is a witness for x i ∈L, and pk is the j-th entry registered by V * in F.
2. the output of M on inputs x 1 ,…,x s .
Σ-protocol. A protocol (P,V) is said to be a Σ-protocol for relation R L if it is of 3-move form (assume (a,e,z) is the three messages exchanged by prover P and verifier V in a session) and satisfies the following conditions:
1)
Completeness: For all (x,w)∈R L , if P has the witness w and follows the protocol, the verifier always accepts;
2) Special soundness: From any x and any pair of accepting transcripts (a,e,z) and (a,e′,z′), where e≠e′, one can efficiently compute w such that (x,w)∈R L ;
3) Special honest-verifier ZK: There exists a polynomial-time simulator M, which on input x and a random
challenge e outputs an accepting transcript of the form (a,e,z) which is (perfect/computational) indistinguishable from real transcript.
Many known efficient protocols such as Refs. [14, 15] are Σ-protocols, furthermore, if one-way functions exist, there is a well-known standard Σ-protocol for Hamiltonian Cycle, and we can obtain Σ-protocols with special honest verifier perfect zero knowledge for NP by using perfect-hiding commitment scheme in the first message of this protocol.
Σ OR -protocol is a special construction with Σ-protocol designed for "or-proof": given two statements x 1 ∈L 1 and x 2 ∈L 2 , it allows a prover to show that he knows a witness for one of the above statements. As demonstrated in
Ref. [3] , given two protocols Σ 1 and Σ 2 for two relationships R 1 and R 2 respectively, we can construct Σ OR -protocol for the following relationship efficiently:
The new protocol is also a Σ-protocol and turns out to be witness indistinguishable.
In our construction, the verifier also executes a Σ OR -protocol to prove the knowledge of one of the secret keys corresponding to his public key. Furthermore, as required in Ref. [11] , we need a partial-witness-independent from this protocol: the message sent at its first round should have distribution independent from any witness for the statement to be proved. We can obtain this property using [15, 16] .
Commitment scheme. A commitment scheme is a two-phase two-party (the sender S and the receiver R)
interactive protocol which has the following properties: 1) hiding: two commitments to different values (here we view a commitment as a variable indexed by the value that the sender committed to) are computationally distinguishable for every probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT, for short) R * ; 2) Binding: after sending the commitment to a value m, any PPT sender S * cannot open this commitment to another value m′ (m≠m′) except with an negligible probability.
When the adversary which plays the role of the sender or the receiver is not restricted to be a PPT, we obtain two different types of commitment scheme with stronger security property. One is the perfect-hiding commitment scheme, in which the hiding property is required to hold against any (computational power unbounded) receiver, and the other is perfect-binding commitment scheme, in which the binding property is required to hold against any (computational power unbounded) sender. In this paper, we mainly use the perfect-hiding commitment scheme.
A New Building Block: Efficient Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge of Committed Discrete Log
In this section we develop two Σ-protocols to prove the knowledge of committed discrete log based on Pedersen's commitment scheme and ElGamal commitment scheme, and these protocols are useful building blocks to implement the concurrent zero knowledge protocol in the BPK model efficiently, which will be described in next section.
Let security parameter be n, p and q be two primes such that p=2q+1, |q|=n, and let G q denote the subgroup of Com is a commitment scheme and r is the random string required in the commitment scheme. Our goal is to construct a Σ-protocol (with common inputs p, q, h 0 , h 1 , C and the description of the commitment scheme Com) in which the prover prove the following "or" statement: Here we adopt the Pedersen's commitment scheme [17] , which enjoys perfect-hiding property. We choose p,q,g,G q described above as the description of the Pedersen's commitment scheme. To commit a value, the receiver picks a random numbers h∈G q , and sends h to the sender. Then the sender commits to a value y as follows: it randomly chooses r∈Z q , computes C=g y h r , sends C to the receiver. To decommit a commitment C, the sender delivers y and r.
In order to construct a Σ-protocol to prove the statement 1, we first construct a protocol to prove the following statement:
Then using the technique from Refs. [15, 16] , it is easy to construct a Σ-protocol for statement 1 (based on the Pedersen's commitment scheme). Now we give the protocol for statement 2.
Protocol 1.
A Σ-protocol for statement 2.
The common inputs: C, g, h, p, q, h 1 .
The Prover's private input: to check that the output of M has the identical probability distribution as conversations between the honest P, V on the common input. □ Now we present a Σ-protocol for statement 1 using the technique in Refs. [15, 16] . Protocol 2. A Σ-protocol for statement 1. h g = ), the protocol enjoys special honest verifier perfect zero knowledge, and turns out to be perfectly witness distinguishable.
The common inputs: C, g, h, p, q, h

A Σ-protocol for statement 1 based on ElGamal's commitment scheme
Now we give another construction of the Σ-protocol for statement 1 based on Elgamal commitment scheme.
ElGamal commitment scheme is a basic application of ElGamal encryption scheme. p, q, g, G q are described in the above subsection, but in this scheme we assumes that the DDH problem in G q is hard. To commit a value y, the sender chooses a random numbers x← R Z q and computes h=g x (note that the sender chooses x itself and the committing stage does not require interaction), then it commits to a value y as follows: it randomly chooses r∈Z q , computes C=(C 1 ,C 2 )=(g r ,g y h r ), sends C to the receiver. To decommit a commitment C, the sender delivers y and r.
The hiding property of this commitment scheme lies in DDH assumption on the subgroup G q , and this scheme enjoys perfect-binding property: it is impossible to open a commitment C in different way for all powerful receivers.
As shown in the above subsection, to construct a Σ-protocol for statement 1, it is sufficient to construct a Σ-protocol for the following statement:
The common input for the Σ-protocol consists of C=(C 1 ,C 2 ), (g,h,p,q), h 1 and the prover's private input is (x 1 ,r). The protocol runs as follows. In the prover's first step, the prover chooses s,t← R Z q randomly, computes It is easy to prove this proposition in a similar way. However, this protocol enjoys special honest-verifier computational ZK only, that is, the transcript generated by the simulator is computational indistinguishable from the real transcript.
Analogously, We can construct a Σ-protocol for statement 1 using the or-proof technique shown in the above subsection. However, the resulting protocol enjoys only computational (not perfect) witness indistinguishability due to the computational-hiding property of the ElGamal commitment Scheme.
Efficient Concurrent Zero Knowledge Arguments with Concurrent soundness for NP in the BPK Model
In this section, we present a 4-round efficient concurrent zero knowledge argument with concurrent soundness in the BPK model for NP under the standard DL assumption.
For the sake of readability, we give some intuition before describing the protocol formally.
Considering a prover wanting to prove that a given string x is a member in a language L. Before the interaction with provers, the verifier generates a key pair and publishes the public key as follows. On inputting security parameter n, the verifier chooses two primes p and q such that p=2q+1, |q|=n, and let G q denote the subgroup of h g = , then publishes h 0 , h 1 as the public key, and keeps x 0 , x 1 secret. Our argument consists of two-phase: in phase one of the argument, the verifier proves to the prover that he knows one of x 0 , x 1 using 3-round partial-witness-independent Σ-protocol. In phase two, the prover uses a commitment scheme Com to compute a commitment to a random strings y, and then proves the following statement using a Σ OR -protocol: x∈L or it commits to one of x 0 , x 1 (i.e., y equals either x 0 or x 1 ).
We make two remarks here.
On differences between the approach in Ref. [11] and ours. We stress that there are two important differences between the approach to construct concurrent zero knowledge in BPK model in Ref. [11] and ours. The first is that in phase 2, Di Crescenzo, et al. have the prover committed to a "challenge" e′ bit by bit for the Σ-protocol in which it proves that the statement to be proven is true using a dedicate atomic (concurrently sound) commitment scheme and sends this commitment along with the first message of this Σ-protocol. Upon receiving the challenge e and the prover answers the challenge e″=e′⊕e. We remark that to commit to the "challeng" e′ bit by bit is unavoidable in Di Crescenzo et al.'s approach. Our approach described above is to use the "or proof" technique to
give a proof that the statement to be proven is true (which is also used in Ref. [12] , and can be dated back to
Ref. [18] . Note that Ref. [11] has shown that there is a flaw in the construction of Ref. [12] , and we show that we can fix it using the commitment scheme Com), and this approach allows us to achieve a significantly more efficient concurrent zero knowledge protocol. The second one is, though our commitment scheme Com performs the same function as the statistically-binding commitment scheme in the atomic commitment scheme in Ref. [11] , we show that computational-binding (with a perfect-hiding) commitment scheme suffices to achieve concurrent soundness of our concurrent zero knowledge argument. This allows us to achieve perfect zero knowledge.
On efficiency. We denote by Π v the proof of knowledge given by the verifier in phase one, similarly, denote by Π p the proof of knowledge given by the prover in phase two. We note that Σ-protocol for the discrete log requires only 3 exponentiations [15] , so we can implement Π v (i.e., "OR-proof" of knowledge of one of two discrete logs) using the technique shown in last section (also see Refs. [15, 16] ) with 6 exponentiations. For the protocol Π p , with assuming a Σ-protocol for a language L in NP, we can construct Π p by using the same "OR-proof" technique to combine the Σ-protocol for the language L and the Σ-protocol for statement 1. Note that this combination incurs only additional overhead of several constant exponentiations (i.e., the exponentiations required in the Σ-protocol for statement 1). Thus, we conclude that our whole transformation (from the Σ-protocol to the concurrent zero knowledge argument for a language L) requires only O(1) additional exponentiations. Note that our transformation is significantly more efficient than the transformation in Ref. [1] , which requires an overhead of Θ(n) exponentiations. Now we describe the protocol fomally. V step 1. Invokes the protocol Π v in which V proves knowledge of x b , and computes the first message of protocol Π v and sends it to P. P step 1
(1) Chooses a random number y∈Z q , picks a random element r∈Z q and computes C=Com(y,r) (note that if the Pedersen's commitment scheme is in use, then the verifier needs to send the first message), i.e., a random number h∈Z q , to the prover in V in the committing phase step 1 because the Pedersen's scheme needs interaction in the committing phase. (1) Computes the last message of protocol Π v according to the challenge send by P in P Step 1, and sends it to P.
(2) Sends a random challenge e of protocol Π p to P. P step 2. P checks whether the transcript of protocol Π v is accepting. If so, P computes the last message z of protocol Π p ;
V decision. V accepts if only if (a,e,z) is an accepting transcript of Π p .
Theorem 1.
If Com is a secure (computational hiding and computational binding) commitment scheme, the protocol 3 described above is a concurrent zero knowledge argument with concurrent soundness for any language L in NP. Furthermore, if the commitment scheme Com enjoys perfect-hiding property, and the Σ-protocol for L (underlying the protocol Π p ) satisfies special honest verifier perfect zero knowledge property, protocol 3 is a perfect zero knowledge argument.
Let's convey some main ideas in the proof first. To see the above argument is a concurrent zero knowledge protocol, consider a simulator that extracts the secret key used in the proof of knowledge given by the Verifier, and then uses the secret key as the witness to simulate the verifier's view straight line. It is no hard to verify that this simulator works. For the concurrent soundness, we first note that the witness indistinguishability is preserved under concurrent composition. If a prover can convince the verifier on a false statement in a session, it must know one of the two discrete log (i.e., x 0 , x 1 ) and therefore we can extract the discrete log. Importantly, the discrete log we extract from the prover will be independent of the discrete log used in the proof of knowledge given by the verifier due to the partial-witness-independent property of Π v and the binding property of Com, this gives us a chance to break the DL assumption.
Proof: Completeness. Straightforward.
Concurrent (perfect) Zero
Knowledge. The analysis is very similar to the analysis presented in Ref. [11] .
Here we omit the tedious proof and just provide some intuition. As usual, we can construct a simulator S that extracts all secret keys corresponding to those public keys registered by the malicious verifier from the executions of Π v and then uses them as witnesses to complete executions of Π p in expected polynomial time. To prove the concurrent zero knowledge property, we need to show that the output of S is indistinguishable from the real interactions. This can be done by constructing a non-uniform hybrid simulator HS and showing the output of HS is indistinguishable from both the output of S and the real interaction. HS runs as follows. Taking as inputs all these secret keys and all the witnesses of statements in interactions, HS computes commitments (at P step 1) exactly as S does but uses the same witnesses as the honest provers do in the executions of Π p . It is easy to see that the output of the hybrid simulator is indistinguishable from both the transcripts of real interactions (because of the computational-hiding property of Com) and the output of S (because of the witness indistinguishability of Π p ), therefore, we prove the output of S is indistinguishable from the real interactions.
If Com enjoys perfect-hiding property and the Σ-protocol for L satisfies special honest verifier perfect zero knowledge, then it is easy to see that Π p is a perfect witness indistinguishable proof, so protocol 3 satisfies perfect zero knowledge.
Concurrent Soundness. We prove this property by contradiction. Assume that the protocol does not satisfy
